Traian Basescu has passed from words to deeds?

The recent statement of the Romanian President Traian Basescu as to his admiration over both Marshal Ion Antonescu, and Romania that fought on the side of the Hitlerite Germany, caused the adequate reaction not only in Russia but also in Ukraine.

So, Dmitry Tymchuk, the head of the Center of the Military-Political Researches for the Academy of security of the open society, “"Khvilya”" has published the article called the distinctive name: “Romania contra Ukraine: scenarios of the armed conflict”.

He sees three scenarios of the armed conflict:
The first scenario is the naval one. It occurs around the development of the Romanian Black Sea shelf of the Zmeiniy Island, or the one is carried out at the same time with the land operation.
As we know, in 2009 the International Court of UN decided that the Zmeiniy Island can not be considered as the part of the offshore line of Ukraine at the determination of the median line at the delimitation of both the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone. Thus, the Romanian side has received about 79.34% of the Black Sea disputed territories (by the way, the experts have predicted as a result of this situation the following: the Romanian win in the conflict around the Danube navigation, as well as the Romanian interests strengthening in Chernovitskaya and Odesskaya regions). In addition we can say that currently in the Ukrainian water areas of the Black Sea about 109 of promising fields of energy, the total reserves of which are estimated at more than 1.5 billion tons of equivalent fuel, were revealed. The resources exploration, according to different estimates, is less than 5% of all reserves, and the validity coefficient of geological exploration reaches 0.5-0.6, - the full-scale works near the Zmeiniy Island were not carried out because of the territorial disputes with Romania.

At the same time, Romania has received the part of the shelf, where mining should be carried out at a considerable depth and this fact greatly increases the cost of the work. It is not inconceivable that in the process of such work, the Romanian side “visits” the Ukrainian territory, where the one continues the further fields’ development. It eventually leads to a power confrontation in the Black Sea with naval forces of both countries participation.

There is the second option, when the local “land” conflict escalates into the full-scale war that involves the two countries; the combat operations come on the sea.
It stands to mention the following basic moments, when comparing the naval forces of Ukraine and Romania:

1) The Ukrainian naval forces are more numerous per the number of ship pendants (26 vs. 14), but they are behind per the number of attack ships (the Romanian navy has 7 of attack ships, i.e. it is half of the total quantity, the Ukrainian naval forces have only 4 units of mentioned ships), and finally per fire power (many times).
In addition the Ukrainian Naval power is unsystematic ships group, its ability to perform integral function is doubtful.
Plus, and it is the most important, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine officially confesses that currently only 7% (!) ships and supply vessels of the Ukrainian naval forces are battle-worthy ones (“White Book - 2010. The armed forces of Ukraine”, Section I);
2). Romania has a submarine fleet, though in the form of one submarine, at the same time Ukraine has nothing;
3) The combat ships of the Romanian naval forces virtually do not have acceptable air defense, in contradistinction from the bulk strength of the Ukrainian naval forces. So, the Romanian fleet could be destroyed by aircraft, but and here Ukraine has their problems (see below);
4) Romania has the Danube that compares favorably with Ukraine. Though these forces do not impress power, but in the case of aggression with the intersection of the Danube - at its first stage they can significantly to support the land group.
It stands to mention that recently the “Navy” scenario of the Romanian aggression has found the place in different discussions of Internet community as to the various scenarios of the possible conflict. But we would not stake on this option - it is interesting in terms of strictly theoretical discussion as to the following: “who is more powerful” on the sea, but the one hardly is realized in practice per only one simple reason: the significant part of the naval surface forces and the command of the Ukrainian navy forces is deployed in Sevastopol. It means that the Romanians in their attempt to destroy them will inevitably strike “at the same time,” the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation, drawn into the conflict Russia, and as result making the one is hopeless for Romania.
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From the military-political point of view for Romania it would be logically to demonstrate the threat to both Crimea and Sevastopol without bringing the case “to the extreme” situation, i.e. without the Russian troops attacking. It would provoke Russia under their current formulation as to the “protection of its citizens" to take control over the Crimea, aggravating the situation of Ukraine. Thus, for Bucharest, there is sense to consider only the possibility of the land operation. At the same time, the navy forces of both sides can carry out the subsidiary tasks.

However, there are minor actions of Navy forces ships of two countries in the Black Sea per the first version of this scenario. But in this case without the strong air support, the Ukrainian Naval forces do not have significant chances against the Romanian naval forces that have significant strike potential. At the same time, Ukraine may use the forces of the Naval Center of the Special purposes of the naval forces of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine in Ochakov (formerly 73rd Maritime Center) to conduct sabotage operations.

The second scenario is “the Danube” one. The reason for this scenario is the territorial dispute as to the Danube five islands belonging (primarily: the islands Maikan and Limba). At present time the building St George's Channel (Romania) work, changed the stream channel of the Danube that opened the door for shipping between the Maikan island and the Ukrainian Bank (previously it was Romanian side way). On that ground, Romania offers to shift the state border to the Ukrainian territory.

The situation is worsened by means of the stiff competition between the Ukrainian bathymetrical navigation pass (BNP), “Danube - Black Sea”" and the Romanian Sulina channel. The fact is that the Ukrainian project took from Romania about 70% of the financial benefits that it previously had received from the passage of the river crafts through the Romanian binnacle of the Danube River. Together with different appeals against Ukraine in international organizations (the Committee of Espoo), during the last time the Romanian side permits direct aggressive actions – for example, when suddenly the Romanian floating excavator invades the Ukrainian territorial waters, emptying bucket of sand on the way to the Ukrainian channel.

At the same time, the invasion of the Romanian troops across the Danube (with the support of the Danube fleet) in Odessa region is not the best option for the Romanians - at least as long as the Moldova is not the part of Romania. The operations space along the line Renee-Ismail- Vilkovo with further access to the Bolgrad and after to the Artsiz (taking into account the nature of the region and the need to cut across the Danube), is obviously not enough for the operational deployment of the Romanian group, which, however, on the Ukrainian territory, in case of the inrush, will face only one mechanized brigade of the 6-th Army Corps of the ground forces of the Ukrainian Army Forces.

It is possible to suppose the invasion option in this direction that is parallel to the combat operations in the North Bukovina. But it is also unlikely, if we take into consideration the paucity of the Romanian Army. Likely, in the “Danube” scenario, we can speak only about the frontier clashes.

The third scenario is the “Bukovinian” one that is the most probable.

It is the most realistic option of the military involvement outbreak between Ukraine and Romania that is in annexationof both Bessarabia and the part of Bukovina that is the modern Ukrainian Chernovitskaya region, to the Romanian territory.
As is known, in 1993, the Romanian Foreign Ministry sent the note to Kiev by which it declared the Agreement on regime of the treaty regime of the Soviet-Romanian national frontier of 1967 as illegal one, and then, in 1994, the Bucharest denounced this Agreement. From then onwards, de facto, Romania does not recognize the post-war division of Europe, pretending to the Ukrainian territory among others. Though in 2003, Ukraine signed the framework agreement with Romania on the regime of the Soviet-Romanian national frontier, cooperation and mutual assistance on the frontier issues, concerning the national frontier line, defined in 1961 (it has opened the way for Romania to both NATO and EU). The agreement has been signed for 10 years, i.e. until 2013, with the right of prolongation every 5 years. However, today we hear from the upper executive management of Romania the statements that are not in compliance with the content of this document directly.

The scenario of Romanian aggression with the invasion in the Northern Bukovina consists of two stages: preparatory and military ones. The preparatory stage is underway at present time. The one is in scoring by the upper executive management of Romania of the territorial claims to the neighboring states, with the aim of the project “Great Romania” project realization.

Parallely, the mass distribution of the Romanian passports to the citizens of the territories, which the Bucharest pretends to, takes place.
The legislative factors forthe effectiveness of the process are created by Bucharestmore than favorable. At the end of 2009,the Romanian Parliamentadopted the new version ofthe Citizenship Act, which simplifiedthe procedure for granting the citizenshipto the residents of the neighboringMoldova and Ukraine.In particular, Article 37 of the Act states:“The foreign citizensand stateless persons,who have been deprivedof the Romanian citizenshipbefore 22December 1989 per different,regardless ofthem reasons,as well astheir descendantshave the rightto return tothe nationality ofRomania”.In other words,under this provision, all the residentsof the Chernovitskaya region up to the Dniester, whose parents (or grandparents) up to June 28, 1940livedin this area andwere the citizens ofRomania are entitled to get the Romanian citizenship.

We would like to notice: per some data of the Ukrainianstate institutions, the boom as to theRomanian citizenshipin the regionpassed still in the early2000s, but at present time the easing conditions provokesits repetition (here the stimulus is understood: the passport of Romania as the EU member gives the opportunity tomove freelyacross Europe that makes it desirableevenfor those citizensof Ukraine,who do not recognize themselvesanddo notthinks as the Romanians as well they feels nocultural unitywith the “historical motherland”). In addition, since 2010 the number of the members of the commission of directorate that granting the citizenship thatconsidersapplications for the Romanianpassports receiving,has been increased fromeightto fifteen, it must increase thespeed of applications processing,alsofor it theadditionalbranches of the directorateare openin the eastern regionsof Romania.

It is problematic to talk about the specificresults of this process: the number of the handed outRomanian passportsacross the Ukrainian territorynobody will indicate. In2010the Romanian siderecognized thedistribution ofno more than 4thousandpassports, in the mediawith the reference to the“nonpublic” information of SSU (Security Service of Ukraine)the numberof more than 50thousand ones (it is unclear what means “more” because it will be 150thousandand 250thousand, andother greatfiguresfitunder this definition.) was mentioned. In reality, this means that Kievdoes not know even approximately the problem scale with which it deals. And so, the insight will beveryunpleasant eventually.

Thus, the conditions for invasion of the Romanian troops on “their” territory (we would like to notice that the one is inhabited by the unknown number of the Romanian citizens, which against the backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis actuality, are quite capable to support the “invaders”).

At the same timeto capturethe Chernovitskaya regionit is quite enough to have the minimalmilitaryland group under the conditions of secrecy of its concentration in the frontier areasand its suddenness ofthe invasion.

At that we would like to notice: for all years of Ukrainian independence it is not known any fact of the Ukrainian troops operational deployment towards the border areas in the event of any neighboring country troop concentration near the borders (for example, during the military training exercise, or without any formal pretence - although the similar cases have occurred for the recent years). It possible to draw conclusions as to the Romanian potential to concentrate its military grouping for the Northern Bukovina invasion, so that Ukraine has not taken the preventive measures.

Meantime, the analysis shows that against the background of the troops lack on the Ukrainian side, the Romanians can take under the control the territory, which they pretend to, by means of, for example, only the following troops (the ones are indicated by the old names):

- 313-th reconnaissance battalion;
- 1st mechanized brigade “Argedava”;
- 2nd infantry operational brigade “Rovine”;
- Separate artillery battalions;
- 53-rd composite surface – to air missile regiment “Trophaeum Traiani”.
It is clear that it will be with the assistance of the army air force.
Obviously, Chernovtsy should be attacked directly. In the west direction the Carpathians are, to act in such environment the Armed Forces of Romania have separate mountain battalions and mountain operational brigade “Sarmizegetusa” with headquarters in Brasov.

The Romanian grouping will face one separate mechanized regiment of 13th Army Corps, deployed in this area (plus units of the Border Troops, equipped with light small arms). With a little refinement: the Romanian troops, equipped fully by the contract servicemen (Romania refused to drawing to the color in 2007), prepared in accordance with +the NATO standards, against the background of the Ukrainian troops, equipped fully by conscript soldiers, with a questionable combat training level.

How can Ukrainian military air forces react strategically? How can the one operate effectively in the interference environment of well prepared Romanian air defense, although without affecting armament? And the most important thing, what kind of the combat tasks can Ukrainian forces execute in opposition to the Romanian scenario? It is also a big question.
So, the Romanians can take under their control the Chernovitskaya region without significant difficulties in the course of the sudden military invasion. The question is, how will the Ukrainian military authority behave further?

If it passes on a diplomatic version of the conflict solution, we can consider the war for Ukraine as lost one. Romania will be able to hold a referendum in an emergency mode on the occupied territories very easy and give the world the results that will not be in favor of Ukraine. Further anyone can not recognize the legitimacy of Northern Bukovina passing into Romania and do it as long as he wants - de facto it will be the Romanian territory, which Bucharest will not give back peacefully ever.

In this situation the so-called “international community”, in every possible way, will appeal the parties to resolve the situation “peacefully”. And these appeals will be quite satisfied for Romania, which can ignore them with the assumption that they will tie Ukraine. Indeed, in this situation, the aggressor dislodging from the occupied territory (and after the referendum – it will become the simply “disputable” one) will mean for Kiev - to attack. And such position is not in a favor of Ukraine.

If Kiev decides to repel aggression, then it has theoretic chances to dislodge the Romanian troops from the Ukrainian territory. But it is quite theoretically. Because the professional skills of the personnel of the Army units, which the Ukrainian command can employ during this operation cause some doubts (it is first of all the units of : 13th Army Corps, army air force, Air Force, and both airmobile and airborne units of 6th and 8th AC (Army Corps)).

At that the important fact should be taken into account - the ability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as to the operational troops shift to the conflict area. And this ability, coupled with the opportunities in combat conditions to organize the support of Ukrainian combat units, is also under considerable doubt (mega-shows like synthetic exercise “Cooperation-2010” that was in the past year should not be very reassuring ones - they were pre-prepared some months). So, if Ukraine decides to repel aggression, it probably will not be looked like the swift-flowing conflict, the one will consist of the stages:

- The Romanian troops invasion, taking under control of the Ukrainian part of the Bukovina and organization of the defense;
- The UAF (Ukrainian Army Forces) units redeploying to the conflict area;
- Beginning by the Ukrainian army group of the operation to dislodge the Romanian troops outside of the State frontier. (At that the version of the combat operations change-over on the Romanian territory is hardly worth considering - Ukraine does not have enough reserves to conduct long-drawn-out conflict against the inability to deliver powerful missile and air strikes on the Romanian infrastructure and communications.)

It is not the best option for Ukraine, - even as for the above mentioned reason (the possibility for Romania to carry out some activities across occupied territory, and the reaction of the “international community” with appeals to resolve the situation peacefully). So there is only one conclusion: the prediction of the product of such conflict is very problematically, even if the Ukrainian military and political leadership seeks to punish the aggressor with the UAF.

The position of Georgia that is located seemingly far away from the location of supposed conflict is representative: there at the borders edge with Russia, the NATO troops practice to perfection the mountain combat operations. It is referred to the Sachkhere military base that is located in the territory of Western Georgia, in Imereti. This object appeared there in 2005, when Saakashvili initiated the comprehensive preparation for the combat operations in South Ossetia.

It is interesting to know: According to the Georgian Ministry of Defense statement, from now on the Sachkhere base the military personnel from NATO countries will be trained in the public. The French Ambassador Eric Fournier along with the Georgian Deputy Defense Minister Nodar Kharshiladze attended the formal ceremony of the Sachkhere mountain-preparatory school opening.

The French diplomat and high-ranking Georgian military official have opened the commemorative plaque, on which pointed out that the base gained the status of PfP (Partnership for Peace – “Partnership for Peace”). At that the representative of Georgia has paid the special attention to the fact that the base in Sachkhere was built by France.

This is the first NATO military training center in the Caucasian region, where both winter and summer maneuvers will take place. Moreover in September here the military training exercise will be with participation of troops from the Baltic States, Poland and the Czech Republic, many of them have been here before. Subsequently, it is expected the arrival of military contingents of other NATO countries.
As early as 2010, the Georgian Ambassador in Ukraine Grigol Katamadze told that in Georgia “the unique modern mountain shooters training is carried out”. Even then, per his declaration, “the representatives of the Great Britain, the United States and other countries” taking the training here. Now everything will be officially and as part of the “Partnership for Peace”.

As to such training themselves, we can only guess. We must draw attention to the fact that the base functions program means its further modernization.

For what does NATO want so demonstrative symbol of its presence in Georgia? The Georgian and South Ossetian experts: George Kadzhaya and Inal Pliyev have shared their opinions in the interview for “Pravda.ru”.

George Kadzhaya, who is the independent Georgian politologist: “Why does the presence of the base in Sachkhere cause such surprise? Just the fact of the French Ambassador appearance here says that NATO takes Georgia under the protection and the one demonstrate for Moscow that if it repeats its aggressive actions, it will have to do with the civilized states. And it is additional confirmation that Georgia is steadily moving towards the NATO membership”.

Inal Pliyev, who is the South Ossetian politologist: “The building the object in Sachkhere is the result of the efforts of France, which has built by this country almost on the border with the South Ossetia. It once again highlights the warpath, which recently Paris demonstrates in relation to other countries. If we can assess the situation with regard to the purely local conditions, it is very similar to the preparation for full-scale aggression against both South Ossetia and Russia. It is clear that Georgia plays subsidiary and subordinate role in this situation. Without the NATO instructions, they will do nothing. And secondly - the NATO leadership itself very good realizes full provocation of its actions in such a difficult conflict region“.
Romania, as NATO member that also has in his army the mountain units, will also send its soldiers to improve their skills on the Sachkhere base. The reasonable question arises: where are the glorious followers of the Ion Antonescu affair going to fight?

It is unlikely that their military plans spread through Tibet, the South American Andes and, especially through the Pyrenees or the Alps, but the Carpathians and Crimean mountains are just nearby...
So the Ukrainian politicians have something to think about... In particular they must think about the situation whether to keep company with Mikhail Saakashvili, who now is creating the next tinderbox in the Caucasus, or not. Concerning him it is everything clear: Saakashvili gives eye-teeth, how by the Caucasian situation rocking, he strongly complicates the Sochi 2014 Olympics conducting.

If he fulfills this task, he will have additional opportunities to beg for assistance of some Western countries, with cap in hand, as to the “return’ of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia,. But the Ukrainian leadership must have a headache on this subject: apart from Russia, no one will help Ukraine in its confrontation with the Romanian revanchists...